Ethical Discourse on the Use of Genetically Modified Crops: A Review of Academic Publications in the Fields of Ecology and Environmental Ethics by Gregorowius, Daniel et al.
ARTICLES
Ethical Discourse on the Use of Genetically Modified
Crops: A Review of Academic Publications in the Fields
of Ecology and Environmental Ethics
Daniel Gregorowius • Petra Lindemann-Matthies •
Markus Huppenbauer
Accepted: 27 July 2011 / Published online: 12 August 2011
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract The use of genetically modified plants in agriculture (GM crops) is
controversially discussed in academic publications. Important issues are whether the
release of GM crops is beneficial or harmful for the environment and therefore
acceptable, and whether the modification of plants is ethically permissible per se.
This study provides a comprehensive overview of the moral reasoning on the use of
GM crops expressed in academic publications from 1975 to 2008. Environmental
ethical aspects in the publications were investigated. Overall, 113 articles from 15
ecology, environmental ethics, and multidisciplinary science journals were sys-
tematically reviewed. Three types of moral concerns were used to structure the
normative statements, moral notions, and moral issues found in the articles: con-
cerns addressing consequences of the use of GM crops, concerns addressing the act
(the technique itself), and concerns addressing the virtues of an actor. Articles
addressing consequences (84%) dealt with general ecological and risk concerns or
discussed specific ecological issues about the use of GM crops. Articles addressing
the act (57%) dealt with the value of naturalness, the value of biotic entities, and
conceptual reductionism, whereas articles addressing the actor (43%) dealt with
virtues related to the handling of risks and the application of GM crops. The results
of this study may help to structure the academic debate and contribute to a better
understanding of moral concerns that are associated with the key aspects of the
ethical theories of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics.
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Introduction
The use of genetically modified plants1 in agriculture (GM crops) is controversially
discussed in academic publications. An important aspect of this controversy is
whether the release of GM crops in agriculture is beneficial or harmful for the
environment and therefore acceptable (Hails 2000; Wolfenbarger and Phifer 2000;
Clark and Lehmann 2001). Arguments against GM crops include concerns that
transgenes might escape into wild populations (e.g., Pilson and Prendeville 2004;
Marvier and Van Acker 2005), that the use of herbicide-resistant GM crops might
lead to an increase in spraying herbicides (e.g., Firbank and Forcella 2000;
Watkinson et al. 2000), and that toxins produced by GM crops might enter the food
web and thus affect non-target organisms (e.g., Marvier 2002; Harwood et al. 2005).
Moreover, concerns have been raised over the spread of transgenic DNA by
horizontal gene transfer to unrelated species (e.g., Ho et al. 1999). Arguments in
favor of GM crops are, for instance, that they might be more suitable than traditional
techniques to control certain pest species (e.g., Cowgill et al. 2004), that the use of
herbicide-resistant GM crops might enhance agricultural biodiversity (e.g., Hails
2002), and that GM crops might require less pesticide use and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions (e.g., Brookes and Barfoot 2005).
These scientific arguments are concerned with the potential consequences of the
use of GM crops. In addition, it has been asked whether the modification of plants is
morally permissible per se (Reiss and Straughan 2002). The modification of plants
will be morally wrong, if it is regarded as an infringement of the integrity or dignity
of plants (e.g., Balzer et al. 2000) or an interference with the natural order (e.g.,
Verhoog et al. 2003). Such concerns address the process of genetic modification
itself. Moreover, there are concerns that are related to the character traits of an actor,
such as the concerns that genetic modification is a disrespectful offense against the
inherent wisdom of nature (e.g., Deane-Drummond 2002) or a sign of human hubris
(e.g., Sandler 2007).
Several review articles have summed up and discussed different moral concerns
in the debate on GM crops (e.g., Robinson 1999; Shelton et al. 2002; Weaver and
Morris 2005). However, none so far provides a comprehensive overview of the
ethical discourse in academic publications on ecological and environmental ethical
aspects. In 2007 and 2008, we thus carried out a systematic literature review of 15
journals (seven ecology journals, five environmental ethics journals, three
multidisciplinary science journals). Our aim was not to reflect the different
opinions on gene technology, but to structure the academic discourse by relating the
morally relevant concerns and issues expressed in the reviewed articles to
1 A GM plant is an organism whose genetic characteristics have been modified by the insertion of an
altered plant gene of the same species (intragenic modification) or a gene from other organisms
(transgenic modification) using genetic engineering (Wartburg and Liew 1999).
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established ethical theories. The structure will add a new view point to ethical tools
that had already been developed for the decision-making in biotechnology (e.g.,
Busch et al. 2002; Mepham 2008). Our article will also contribute to the current
debate on the ethics of genetically modifying plants (e.g., Balzer et al. 2000).
Methodology
Preparation of the Literature Review
Before the actual literature review, we analyzed moral concerns about GM crops
found in various monographs, proceedings, and anthologies about gene technology,
plant ethics, risk perception, and related issues (e.g., Runtenberg 1997; Balzer et al.
1998; Rolston 1999; Busch et al. 2002; Heaf and Wirz 2002; Kallhoff 2002; Reiss
and Straughan 2002; Ammann et al. 2003; Stewart 2004; Deane-Drummond 2004;
Sandler 2007; Sto¨cklin 2007). Three types of moral concerns were most prominent
and thus used to structure the normative statements, moral notions and moral issues
found in the subsequent literature review: (1) concerns about the consequences of
the use of GM crops in agriculture (in the following called ‘‘moral concerns
addressing consequences’’), (2) concerns about the moral permissibility of genetic
modification as such (‘‘moral concerns addressing the act’’), and (3) concerns about
human character traits and attitudes that either contribute to or are influenced by
using gene technology (‘‘moral concerns addressing the actor’’).
Relevant Ethical Theories
The three types of moral concerns can be linked to well known theories in
environmental ethics (cf. Brennan and Lo 2008)2: (1) moral concerns addressing
consequences to consequentialism, (2) moral concerns addressing the act to
deontology, and (3) moral concerns addressing the actor to virtue ethics.
Consequentialism
This normative theory states that the rightness or wrongness of an action has to be
judged in light of the value of its consequences (Kutschera 1999; Brink 2006). A
consequentialist concept has to define the values that are worth to be promoted by
the outcome of an action (Brink 2006), e.g., personal pleasure, satisfaction of
personal interests, or perfection of personal essential capacities. In order to find the
best outcome, alternative actions have to be evaluated and harms and benefits of the
consequences of one’s action have to be weighed against each other. The one action
has to be chosen that promotes the defined value in the best way, which means that
2 Besides the three mentioned normative ethical theories, other theories exist that are discussed in context
of gene technology, e.g., contractualism. However, contractualism as an ethical theory of social contract
could hardly be applied to the ethics of GM crops, because plants cannot be part of a social contract.
Therefore, deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics were chosen as an underlying basis for our
analysis.
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harms are outweighed by benefits. Consequentialism allows tradeoffs between
alternative actions with the aim of maximizing the overall good for the greatest
number of morally relevant entities,3 e.g., maximizing the happiness for the greatest
number of people.
Deontology
This normative theory states that the moral evaluation of an action depends on the
action’s quality, i.e., certain actions are right or wrong per se and thus either
permitted or forbidden (Kutschera 1999; McNaughton and Rawling 2006). The
rightness of an action is judged based on the action’s compliance with a certain rule
or principle for the sake of this rule or principle. The balancing between advantages
and disadvantages of an action as in consequentialism is not a prime concern. Moral
absolutists would state that, as it is the action itself that is important, a morally good
act must be performed even if it has a bad consequence (Herold 2008). In addition to
this approach, there is a huge diversity of theories that have been described as
deontological (Gaus 2001a; Gaus 2001b). For instance, many deontologists do not
agree with a moral absolutism and argue that exceptions should be made to avoid
catastrophic outcomes (McNaughton and Rawling 2006). Often, deontological
theories include considerations of respect for morally relevant entities for their own
sake, and considerations of justice.
Virtue Ethics
This normative theory is centered on the individual actor who shows certain virtues.
A virtue is a character trait, state or disposition that allows a person to act in a way
that individual and collective well-being is promoted. To be named as a virtue, a
character trait has to embody a commitment to an ethical value such as justice or
benevolence that will provide a built-in ethical guidance for a moral agent (Annas
2006). Virtue ethics implies that acting morally right is based on the actor’s moral
personal attitudes and convictions. This means that the value of an action can be
judged by the value of the virtues leading to this act (Rippe and Schaber 1998). The
aim of a virtuous person is to develop an excellent character. Therefore, in virtue
ethics an action will be judged as morally good if the actor shows a virtuous
character (Annas 2006). Apart from pure forms of virtue ethics various pluralistic
forms exist that allow non-virtue-based reasons that also play a role in deontology or
consequentialism (Hursthouse 2003; Crisp 2003).
Although the three classical normative theories form the basis of our analysis, we
do not classify these concerns in the literature review as consequentialist,
deontological, or virtue concerns. This would be problematic as there exist, for
instance, forms of so called non-teleological consequentialism that evaluate the
outcome of an act in applying deontological criteria (cf. Birnbacher 2007). This
means that the consequences of the act are morally judged by the number of
3 Biotic entities can be single organisms, species, ecosystems, or the biotic community.
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individual rights that are respected or by the number of intrinsically right or wrong
actions, which result as further consequences from doing the act (Birnbacher 2007).
Moreover, many deontologists include consequences in their moral reasoning.
However, the normative statements, moral notions, and moral issues found in the
articles can be assigned to the key issues of the normative theories, i.e., the moral
concerns addressing consequences, the act itself, or the actor.
Review of the Academic Literature
We pre-selected 18 journals from the fields of ecology and environmental ethics as
well as multidisciplinary science journals for review (see Table 1). The period
reviewed was from 1975 (first conference on the safety of recombinant DNA
research in Asilomar, California; see Stewart 2004) to 2008. In the initial selection
process, we asked colleagues from biology and philosophy to indicate suitable
journals for the literature review. Based on this information, the ten ecology journals
with the highest impact factor in 20064 (start of study) were selected. As for most
journals in environmental ethics no impact factor was available at that time, those
journals were chosen that were recommended by all colleagues, i.e., five renowned
environmental ethics journals dealing specifically with ecological and agricultural
topics. In addition, three important and well-renowned multidisciplinary science
journals were selected (Table 1).
Environmental ethics journals were selected as we supposed that the ecological
and environmental ethical debate about GM crops will primarily take place in this
type of journals. Nevertheless, we also wanted to investigate whether moral
Table 1 Overview of journals reviewed and number of relevant articles found (in brackets)
Ecology journals (15) IF Environmental ethics
journals (74)
IF Multidisciplinary
science journals
(24)
IF
Trends in ecology & evolution
(5)
14.1 Journal of agricultural and
environmental ethics (55)
0.7 Science (8) 30.0
Annual Review of Ecology,
Evolution, and Systematics (1)
9.8 Environmental Ethics (2) Nature (11) 26.7
Ecology Letters (0) 7.6 Environmental Values (9) Gaia (5)
Ecological Monographs (0) 7.1 Ethics & The Environment
(3)
Frontiers in Ecology and the
Environment (2)
4.8 Ethics in Science and
Environmental Politics (5)
Molecular Ecology (1) 4.8
Ecology (2) 4.8
Journal of Applied Ecology (3) 4.5
Journal of Ecology (0) 4.2
Ecological Applications (1) 3.5
If applicable, the impact factor (IF, 2006) is shown
4 The journals were selected in 2007. At this time, the most recent impact factor was from 2006.
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concerns about GM crops are raised in ecology journals. As journals in this field
focus primarily on mere empirical questions, we selected a larger number of
journals to have a greater chance to find relevant articles dealing with ethical
concerns. As our literature review focused on the debate on GM crops in an
environmental ethics context, journals from the fields of microbiology, biotechnol-
ogy, or general moral philosophy were not assessed.
Online search engines of the journals or of JSTOR (Journal Storage)5 were
used to identify relevant articles for the literature review. Different types of
keywords were used that referred to the genetic nature of the modification, the
modification or engineering itself, and to plants or crops (Table 2). Keywords of
one type were used in all different combinations with those of the other two types.
In order not to exclude too many articles, we did not refine our search by using
keywords like ‘‘value,’’ ‘‘respect,’’ ‘‘dignity,’’ ‘‘integrity,’’ ‘‘justice,’’ or ‘‘risk.’’
For two journals (‘‘Environmental Ethics,’’ ‘‘Environmental Values’’) no online
search engines were available. Articles in these journals were selected by studying
titles and abstracts.
Initially, more than 3,300 articles from 18 journals were selected and their titles
and abstracts briefly examined. Articles that only briefly mentioned ecological or
ethical issues or that were book reviews, editorials, and short news articles were
immediately excluded. The remaining 250 original research and review articles
were studied in more detail. Those articles that actually dealt with ecological or
environmental concerns about GM crops from an ethical point of view were
identified. Original research articles in ecology journals that did not address the
moral relevance of empirical findings they discussed were excluded from the
subsequent analysis. Finally, 113 articles from 15 journals remained.6
From the normative statements, moral notions, and issues found in the 113
articles, basic semantic units were extracted. These basic semantic units could be,
for instance, morally qualified empirical findings such as ‘‘harmful impact of GM
crops on non-target insects,’’ normative statements such as ‘‘gene technology is
morally problematic because it is playing God,’’ moral notions such as ‘‘dignity of
plants,’’ or issues that were related to principles or concepts with underlying moral
implications such as the precautionary principle, global justice, or sustainable
Table 2 Keywords used in the
search for relevant articles
Keywords in the first column
were used in all different
combinations with those in the
second and third column
Keywords 1 Keywords 2 Keywords 3
Gene(s) Engineering Plant(s)
Genetic(s) Modification(s) Crop(s)
Genetical(ly) Modify/ied
Transgene(s) (Bio)technology/ies
Transgenic(s)
GM(O)
5 JSTOR (Journal Storage) is an online system for archiving academic journals and provides a full-text
search of digitized issues of several hundred journals. See Homepage jstor.org.
6 Full list of all reviewed articles is available from author 1.
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development.7 Basic semantic units were joined to form classes of similar content.
For example, the empirical finding ‘‘harmful impact of GM crops on non-target
insects’’ was sorted under the header of ‘‘impact on species’’ and the notion ‘‘dignity
of plants’’ under ‘‘individual biotic entities.’’ The classes of similar content were
finally assigned to certain clusters of moral concerns that fell under the header of
one of the three moral concerns mentioned above. In order to assign semantic units
to one of these concerns, it was necessary to clarify in which conceptual context
they were used in the article (e.g., in context of sustainable agriculture or of the
character traits of a person).
Semantic units (and thus the articles using them) that dealt with the outcome of
the release of GM crops were grouped under the header of moral concerns
addressing consequences. Articles that addressed consequences in purely empirical
ecological terms (e.g., that there is a certain probability that hybrids between wild
plants and GM crops can establish in the landscape) were only included in the
analysis, if the moral relevance of the outcome was clearly expressed (e.g., certain
consequences of the release of GM crops are beneficial or harmful for biodiversity).
Articles that dealt with environmental consequences in general terms (e.g., that
there are risks for the environment) were only included if their moral relevance was
clarified, for instance, by relating this general concerns about consequences to a
concern with a normative implication (e.g., sustainability and its underlying
concepts of global justice for recent and future generations). However, semantic
units that questioned the permissibility of genetic modification per se (e.g., arguing
against gene technology because of its ‘‘unnaturalness’’) were grouped under the
header of moral concerns addressing the act itself. Semantic units that were related
to personal motivations, states, dispositions, or character traits of a moral agent and
thus to a virtue or vice were grouped under the header of moral concerns addressing
the actor.
Results
Overview of Results
The great majority of articles were published in journals in the field of
environmental ethics and almost half of all even in one single journal (‘‘Journal
of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics’’) (see Table 1). With the exception of
two articles (Cohen 1977; Dickson 1980), the reviewed literature was published
between 1988 and 2008 (Fig. 1). Since then, growing attention to the use of GM
crops in agriculture was apparent in the scrutinized literature. Most articles were
published between 1999 and 2008.
Almost all articles from ecology journals and most of those from the other two
types dealt with moral concerns addressing consequences (Table 3). However,
concerns addressing the act or the actor were also prominent in the literature,
especially in journals in the field of environmental ethics.
7 Only ecological concerns underlying these concepts are relevant for our analysis.
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Moral Concerns Addressing Consequences
More than 80% of all articles addressed consequences of the use of GM crops in
agriculture. They dealt primarily with general ecological and risk concerns and also
discussed specific ecological issues about the use of gene technology (Table 4).
Overall, 50 articles dealt with both types of concerns, 42 articles only with general
ecological and risk concerns, and three articles only with specific ecological
concerns.
General Ecological and Risk Concerns
Under this header we grouped all concerns about risk assessment principles or
general concepts (e.g., the concept of sustainability) that have ethical implications.
Moreover, concerns about ecological risks and benefits that did not further specify
the morally relevant entities affected by the presence of GM crops were grouped
here. Four groups of moral concerns were present in the literature (see Table 4):
concerns related to risk assessment, risk management and risk perception, concerns
about (scientific) uncertainty, concerns about sustainable development, and
unspecified concerns about ecological risk and benefits.
Fig. 1 Number of articles per year in the reviewed period sorted by the three different types of moral
concerns
Table 3 Assignment of articles that express a certain moral concern to three different types of journals
Number and proportion of articles by journal type
Ecology
journals (15)
Environmental
ethics journals (74)
Multidisciplinary
science journals (24)
Moral concerns addressing consequences 14/93.3% 64/86.5% 17/70.8%
Moral concerns addressing the act 5/33.3% 49/66.2% 10/41.7%
Moral concerns addressing the actor 4/26.7% 38/51.4% 6/25.0%
Multiple assignments were possible. List of journals in Table 1
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Concerns related to risk assessment, risk management, and risk perception were
often mentioned or discussed in the literature (see Table 4). Overall, 62 of these
articles were related to risk assessment, 12 to risk management, and 21 to risk
perception. In 21 articles concerns about risk assessment and risk management were
discussed in detail, most often addressing the precautionary principle (e.g., Carr
2002; Mayer and Stirling 2002; Myhr and Traavik 2002; Skorupinski 2002).
Concerns about (scientific) uncertainty were frequently present (see Table 4), but
discussed in detail in only nine articles (Kasanmoentalib 1996; Carr and Levidow
2000; Carr 2002; Myhr and Traavik 2002; Myhr and Traavik 2003a; Howard and
Donnelly 2004; Bo¨schen et al. 2006; Jensen 2006; Ramjoue´ 2007). Articles under
this header were mostly published in environmental ethics journals (n = 27). Those
articles that merely mentioned uncertainty (n = 34) did this most often in the
context of discussing environmental risk assessment (n = 29) and consequences
(n = 24). Those articles that dealt with uncertainty in detail discussed, for instance,
the ethical implications of unknown risks or unpredictable side-effects of GM crops
(e.g., Kasanmoentalib 1996) or the concept of ‘‘non-knowledge’’ (Bo¨schen et al.
2006).
Concerns about sustainable development were identified in about a quarter of all
articles (see Table 4) and addressed in detail in ten articles. Most articles addressed
the contribution of gene technology to the future development of agriculture (e.g.,
Duvick 1995; Wenz 1999; Pouteau 2000; Snow 2003). The sustainable development
of agriculture, including societal questions, was discussed in detail in ecology
journals (e.g., Hoffman and Caroll 1995), environmental ethics journals (e.g.,
Duvick 1995), and multidisciplinary science journals (e.g., Altmann and Ammann
1992).
Unspecified concerns about ecological risk and benefits could be sorted into
socio-economic, unspecified risk, and unspecified moral concerns (see Table 4).
However, socio-economic concerns were only relevant when they referred to
ecological/environmental ethical issues. Socio-economic concerns were identified in
35 articles (see Table 4). They included, for instance, concerns about social and
environmental justice (e.g., Osborn 2002), concerns about benefits or harms for
future generations (e.g., Wambugu 1999), the acknowledgement of ‘‘non-scientific’’
concerns of the public (e.g., Devos et al. 2008), or the establishment of a societal
contract with the public (e.g., Bruce 2002a).
Unspecified risk concerns addressed environmental concerns about the release of
GM crops that were not further specified. They were identified in 31 articles (see
Table 4) and dealt, for instance, with underlying scientific principles for ecolog-
ically-based risk assessment (e.g., Regal 1994) or invoked the image of farmers as
‘‘stewards of the countryside’’ who are involved in environmental protection (e.g.,
Hails 2002). The notion ‘‘stewards of the countryside’’ is related to moral concerns
about the actor and thus linked to virtue ethics.
Unspecified moral concerns were present in seven articles (see Table 4) that dealt
with general normative aspects of consequences of gene technology. These articles
discussed the consequentialist implication of the ‘‘harm principle’’ as such (Holtug
2001), referred to potential benefits or harms of GM crops in context of the ‘‘future
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benefits argument’’8 (e.g., Burkhardt 2001), or addressed ecological risks in the light
of underlying research paradigms of science (e.g., Scott 2005).
Specific Ecological Concerns
Articles under this header were quite common in the assessed literature and
mentioned or discussed ecological consequences for individual plants as well as for
species, ecosystems, or the environment in general (see Table 4). Consequences in
light of the moral status of individual plants were of hardly any interest, even in
environmental ethics journals. Only two articles (Balzer et al. 2000; Holtug 2001)
went into detail about consequences for single plant organisms. Balzer et al. (2000)
pointed out that the dignity of individual plants (in this article a consequentialist
interpretation is favored) is violated if plants are prevented from performing the
functions that members of their species can normally perform. Holtug (2001)
addressed the impact of gene technology on individual organisms (in context of the
consequentialist ‘‘harm principle’’), but denied that plants could be violated,
because they cannot suffer. Other articles discussed whether the use of GM crops is
a violation of the value of species and ecosystems (Comstock 1989; Comstock
1990). Articles in this group also stated that certain effects such as gene flow or non-
target effects might have (harmful) consequences for the environment in general.
These articles discussed the impact on agricultural biodiversity in general (e.g.,
Gura 2001; Hails 2002; Kotschi 2008) or pointed out that farmland biodiversity
might be increased by the use of herbicide resistant crops (e.g., Madsen and Sandøe
2001).
Articles that dealt with specific ecological concerns often discussed ecological
risks for certain entities on the background of risk assessment and its underlying
principles (n = 36), especially the precautionary principle (e.g., Mayer and Stirling
2002; Myhr and Traavik 2002; Howard and Donnelly 2004). They also discussed
ecological issues in the context of general concerns about risk and benefits (n = 36),
for instance, the question whether the use of GM crops and organic farming is
incompatible or not (e.g., Bruce 2003). Moreover, unknown risks and unpredictable
side-effects of GM crops on certain species or the environment in general were
discussed (n = 24) (e.g., Kasanmoentalib 1996; Clark and Lehmann 2001; Scott
2005). Articles in this group also addressed specific consequences for the
environment invoking the concept of sustainable development (n = 16) (e.g.,
Wenz 1999; Krebs et al. 1999).
Moral Concerns Addressing the Act
Articles under this header addressed concerns about the value of naturalness, the
value of biotic entities, and about conceptual reductionism (Table 5). Such concerns
were articulated in order to question the permissibility of gene technology per se.
Overall, 30 articles dealt only with the value of naturalness and six only with the
8 The ‘‘future benefits argument’’ (FBA) is an utilitarian ethical argument offered by proponents of
agricultural biotechnology to justify continued research and development in gene technology.
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value of biotic entities. Moreover, one article dealt only with conceptual
reductionism. However, 27 articles dealt with two different concerns and three
articles with all three concerns.
The term ‘‘value’’—in this context—means ‘‘intrinsic value,’’ i.e., that objects or
actions have an end in themselves and cannot be reduced to a mere instrumental
value for humans (O’Neill et al. 2006). Some environmental philosophers such as
Taylor (1986) distinguished between intrinsic value and inherent worth. In the
literature assessed both notions were used in the same sense. The term ‘‘intrinsic
value,’’ of course, is not limited to moral concerns addressing the act.
Concerns About the Value of Naturalness
Naturalness as a value implies that nature and its order is valuable and good per se.
Thus, all forms of genetic modification are unnatural and therefore morally wrong.
None of the articles from ecology journals or multidisciplinary science journals
explicitly referred to the value of naturalness. Overall, 15 articles from the
environmental ethics journals discussed concerns about the value of naturalness as
such (e.g., Katz 1993; Karafyllis 2003; Verhoog et al. 2003; Siipi 2008). Articles in
ecology journals only indirectly addressed concerns about naturalness. Authors
argued, for instance, that gene technology just simulates a natural process (Tiedje et
al. 1989). They stated that barriers that are crossed by biotechnology are comparable
to those constantly crossed in nature (Tiedje et al. 1989). It was also discussed
whether gene technology is unnatural in the sense that it is the ultimate
manifestation of the cybernetic control of humans (Elliott and Cole 1989).
Nature as a safety mechanism was addressed in 31 articles (see Table 5). This
type of concern implies that ‘‘nature knows best,’’ because nature is the result of a
long evolutionary process (cf. Reiss and Straughan 2002). Therefore, the inherent
safety mechanisms of nature should be protected as otherwise there would be a
violation of natural evolution (Madsen et al. 2002). The intrinsic value of nature lies
in the inherent safety mechanisms of natural evolution and these mechanisms would
no longer function as an insurance against disastrous consequences if humans
disturb them (e.g., Madsen et al. 2002). The safety net of nature is helpful
in situations where humans’ assumptions about the functioning of nature might be
proved wrong (e.g., Karafyllis 2003). As far as the emphasis is on the avoidance of
disastrous consequences, the concept of nature as a safety mechanism can be
regarded as a ‘‘moral concern addressing consequences’’ and grouped there.
However, if nature as a safety mechanism is subsumed under the header of ‘‘moral
concerns addressing the act,’’ the intrinsic value of the safety mechanism lies in
nature as such, which invokes that the violation of this intrinsic value is morally
problematic per se.
Nature as a guiding principle was addressed in 29 articles (see Table 5). These
articles dealt either with nature as a given order or with nature as an autonomous
identity. The concept of nature as a given order defines nature as a non-human
domain or as God’s order that humans have to respect. The more human actions or
products resemble natural actions or products, the more natural they are, and the
more respect humans show for the natural order (Siipi 2008). The natural order,
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which has an intrinsic value, can be understood in terms of harmony and balance
(Lammerts van Bueren and Struik 2005), self-realization (Katz 1993), God’s
creation (Comstock 1989) or ‘‘something out there’’ that humans must obey and
should not challenge (Madsen et al. 2002). The genetic modification of crops is
therefore an infringement of the given order and thus morally wrong.
The concept of nature as an autonomous identity states that an inherent purpose
can be ascribed to nature as a whole or to single natural entities. When humans
intervene in nature and create artifacts, they destroy the autonomy of nature by
imposing a system of domination (Katz 1993). By inserting foreign genes into a
plant’s genome, borders of species are crossed and their identity is infringed. GM
crops are therefore unnatural and, in consequence, morally wrong. Human beings
are called to respect the autonomy of nature. The concept of nature as an
autonomous identity can be linked to the virtue of appreciation (cf. Katz 1993).
Concerns About the Value of Biotic Entities9
Articles under this header regarded gene technology as a violation of the intrinsic
value of biotic entities, i.e., a disrespect to organisms and life in general. The term
‘‘intrinsic value’’ was either mentioned directly or indirectly by using terms like
‘‘integrity’’ or ‘‘dignity.’’ Integrity is defined as the intrinsic value of a biotic entity
that accomplishes its natural aim (Lammerts van Bueren and Struik 2005), which
includes both individual and holistic entities, whereas dignity is assigned only to
individual organisms (Balzer et al. 2000).10 No one article in the ecology journals or
the multidisciplinary science journals dealt with concerns about the value of biotic
entities. In six articles published in the ‘‘Journal of Agricultural and Environmental
Ethics’’ and in two articles published in the journal ‘‘Environmental Values’’
concerns about the value of biotic entities were discussed in detail. Among these
articles, three dealt with the concepts ‘‘integrity’’ and ‘‘dignity’’ (Balzer et al. 2000;
Melin 2004; Lammerts van Bueren and Struik 2005), three with the concept of
‘‘integrity’’ (Verhoog et al. 2003; Dobson 1995; Westra 1998), and one with the
concept of ‘‘dignity’’ (Heeger 2000). Another article discussed the intrinsic value of
animals and also mentioned that of plants (Verhoog 1992).
The intrinsic value of holistic biotic entities was addressed in 22 articles (see
Table 5). In these articles, an intrinsic value is ascribed to species, (agricultural)
ecosystems or the whole biotic community. The intrinsic value of species lies in the
‘‘wholeness’’ of species, their ability to fulfill species-specific characteristics, and
their being in balance with the environment (Lammerts van Bueren and Struik
2005). Every human action that hinders species to fulfill their species-specific
characteristics would be morally wrong. Overall, 11 articles addressed such
concerns about the intrinsic value of species (see Table 5).
9 The term ‘‘biotic entities’’ refers to individual organisms as well as to species, ecosystems, or the biotic
community.
10 Balzer et al. (2000) discussed different meanings and understandings of dignity, including
deontological meanings. However, they favoured a consequentialist meaning.
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Only five articles addressed the intrinsic value of ecosystems (see Table 5) which
lies in the harmony and balance of their biotic and abiotic elements (Verhoog et al.
2003; Deckers 2005; Lammerts van Bueren and Struik 2005). Humans should
follow the ‘‘ecological knowledge of nature’’ in cultivating the land (Verhoog et al.
2003). As ‘‘ecological integrity’’ results from natural, evolutionary processes,
human-induced interferences such as gene technology must be banned (Westra
1998).
The intrinsic value of the biotic community was expressed in 14 articles (see
Table 5). This value lies in the ability of life for self-regulation in order to
accomplish a certain inherent purpose (Lammerts van Bueren and Struik 2005). In
this context, integrity is understood as the state of ‘‘wholeness’’ or ‘‘completeness’’
of life allowing it to perform all the functions that are characteristic for the biotic
community. Verhoog (1992) discussed this concept in terms of something
(recognizable by phenomena such as homeostasis, stability, balance, and equilib-
rium) that can be disturbed by human actions. Dobson (1995) understood the
intrinsic value of the biotic community in a similar way, stating that genetic
engineering could be problematic because it is a technology that expresses a world
view of human mastery over the non-human world.11 Overall, eight articles dealing
with the value of the biotic community addressed the ‘‘land ethics’’ and cited the
well-known notion about the ‘‘integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community’’ (Comstock 1989; Verhoog 1992; Dobson 1995; Saner 2000). This
integrity can be irreversibly disturbed by human actions such as gene technology
(Verhoog 1992).
The intrinsic value of individual biotic entities was addressed in five articles (see
Table 5). Three articles dealt with both the concept of integrity and the concept of
dignity. One article referred only to the concept of integrity and stated that integrity
can only be guaranteed if the specific phenotype of an individual plant is in balance
with its environment (e.g., Lammerts van Bueren and Struik 2005). Another article
pointed to the concept of dignity: Balzer et al. (2000) critically discussed a
deontological interpretation of dignity and also an interpretation based on the
concept of the ‘‘telos’’ (aim of an organism) that corresponds with the genetic make-
up of an organism. This interpretation defines a plant’s well-being as the potential of
the individual (characterized by its genetic make-up) to develop to maturity.
According to these meanings of dignity, changing the genome through genetic
modification would collide with the integrity or dignity of an organism. This is in
line with a deontological interpretation of dignity or integrity and was thus grouped
under the header of ‘‘moral concerns addressing the act.’’ However, Balzer et al.
(2000) favored a consequentialist interpretation of the ‘‘dignity of plants.’’
Concerns about Conceptual Reductionism
Articles under this header addressed the reductionist perspective in handling gene
technology. Two different types of reductionism can be distinguished (Woese
2004): a methodological reductionism that is the mode of scientific analysis, and a
11 Concerns about the human mastery over the non-human world are also topics within virtue concerns.
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conceptual reductionism that is part of a worldview stating that the whole is no more
than the sum of its part. Concerns about conceptual reductionism represent a
fundamental critique of the materialistic worldview and of the treatment of biotic
entities only as a means to an end and not as ends in themselves. For opponents of
gene technology, such a conceptual reductionism is inherent in the genetic
modification of plants. In consequence, they condemn gene technology per se.
Concerns about conceptual reductionism were rarely expressed in the literature
(see Table 5). Articles that dealt with the concern often addressed naturalness or the
intrinsic value of organism. For instance, one article stated that in a ‘‘process of
reduction’’ the distinctions between the living and the non-living and between the
‘‘nature’’ of plants, animals and humans disappears at the molecular level (Verhoog
1992). As the idea of ‘‘crossing species barriers’’ seems to be irrelevant at the
molecular level, humanity is getting further and further away from nature as given
to humans (Verhoog 1992). This ‘‘reduction of life to the digital code of DNA’’ is
critically related to the fictional character of Frankenstein (Scott 2000) and thus to
concerns about the value of naturalness. Moreover, the critique of reductionism was
addressed in context of the perception of risks and scientific uncertainties about
risks (e.g., Verhoog et al. 2003; Deckers 2005). Linked to this conceptual
reductionism were concerns about the moral status of biotic entities (Verhoog et al.
2003; Deckers 2005).
Moral Concerns Addressing the Actor
Articles under this header referred to virtues related to the handling of risks or to the
application of GM crops (Table 6). Overall, 26 articles dealt only with virtues
related to the handling of risks, 19 only with virtues related to the application of GM
crops and three with both types. As concerns addressing the actor are linked to a
person’s character traits and want to define what constitute a ‘‘good life’’ of humans,
they are part of virtue ethics.
Table 6 Assignment of articles to moral concerns addressing the actor
III. Moral concerns addressing the actor (48/42.5%)
1. Virtues related to the handling
of risks (29/25.7%)
1.1. Virtues related to trust in actors
to handle risks (22/19.5%)
1.1.1. Trustworthiness
1.2. Virtues related to responsible
behavior and awareness
of consequences (12/10.6%)
1.2.1. Responsibility
2. Virtues related to the
application of GM crops
(22/19.5%)
2.1. Virtues related to temperance in
application of GM crops (16/6.4%)
2.1.1. Humility (11/9.7%)
2.1.2. Wisdom (6/5.3%)
2.2. Virtues related to integration into
nature (8/3.2%)
2.2.1. Care (5/4.4%)
2.2.2. Justice (4/3.5%)
2.3. Virtues related to respect for
non-human life (7/2.8%)
2.3.1. Appreciation
Multiple assignments of articles were possible. In brackets: number and proportion of articles
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Most articles did not discuss virtues as such (n = 34), but dealt indirectly with
concerns about the actor by speaking of trust, precaution, or responsibility in
handling with risks (e.g., Altmann and Ammann 1992; Segal 2001). Nevertheless, in
14 articles concerns about the actor were addressed in detail: five articles discussed
different types of virtue concerns (Bruce 2002b; Deane-Drummond 2002; Pascalev
2003; Sandler 2004; Kirkham 2006) and nine articles dealt with certain virtues such
as trustworthiness, precaution, respect, or humility (Scott 2000; Mayer and Stirling
2002; Myhr and Traavik 2002; Bruce 2002a; Bruce 2003; Vogel 2003; Scott 2003;
Munnichs 2004; Paula and Birrer 2006).
Virtues Related to the Handling of Risks
Virtues related to the handling of risks are trustworthiness and responsibility (see
Table 6). The virtue of trustworthiness referred to trust (or distrust) of the public
towards scientific researchers, regulatory procedures, as well as political and
economic institutions (e.g., Scott 2003; Munnichs 2004). The virtue of responsi-
bility referred to a general awareness of humans of the outcomes of their work and
research (Altmann and Ammann 1992), care for the environment (Myhr and Traavik
2002), and care for the future (Deblonde and du Jardin 2005). Virtues related to the
handling of risks are only indirectly dealing with environmental concerns as they
focus on how scientists should behave and what the public (as consumers) can
expects from sciences, politics, and the market. Thus, they are linked to socio-
economic questions.
Virtues Related to the Application of GM Crops
Virtues referring to the application of GM crops were humility, wisdom, care,
justice, and appreciation (see Table 6). The virtues humility and wisdom call for
temperance in the application of GM crops. Humility acknowledges that humans
can never entirely know the outcomes of their actions (Vogel 2003). This virtue is
morally required for a proper understanding of human’s relationship with the natural
environment (Sandler 2004) and implies a certain handling of scientific procedures
and knowledge (Mayer and Stirling 2002). Seen this way, the precautionary
principle embodies humility regarding scientific procedures and knowledge (Mayer
and Stirling 2002). The virtue of wisdom acknowledges that humans have to interact
cautiously with their environment to avoid a domination of nature. Wisdom is
closely related to the virtues of prudence, temperance, precaution, and practical
wisdom (Deane-Drummond 2002).12
The virtues of care and justice apply to motivations and attitudes concerning
humans’ integration into nature. Care is related, for instance, to questions regarding
the technological development (Atkinson 2002) or the sustainable approach in
agriculture (Osborn 2002; Verhoog et al. 2003). The virtue of justice is understood
12 We agree with Celia Deane-Drummond (2002) who states that the virtue of wisdom includes the
virtues of prudence, temperance, precaution, and practical wisdom. Therefore, as long as these virtues
were mentioned, they were considered as the virtue of wisdom.
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as a disposition that takes into account the importance of non-human species as part
of the overall ecological community (e.g., Deane-Drummond 2002). Justice is said
to embody questions dealing with the precautionary principle (Deane-Drummond
2002; Osborn 2002).
The virtue of appreciation is related to the respect for non-human life, e.g.,
the respect for the abilities and vulnerabilities of non-human life (Wenz 1999), the
respect for the existence of individual life-projects and goals (Westra 1998), or the
reverence for the autonomy of nature as a whole (Katz 1993; Dobson 1995). As
appreciation is dealing with the relationship of humans with nature, it is linked to
deontological questions concerning the value of nature and its biotic entities
(cf. Westra 1998).
Discussion
Overview of the Academic Debate on GM Crops
We have identified three types of moral concerns in the academic debate on GM
crops: (1) moral concerns about the consequences of the modification or of the
outcomes of GM crops in the environment (associated with consequentialist ethics),
(2) moral concerns addressing the act of modifying the genome of plants per se
(associated with deontological ethics), and (3) moral concerns addressing the
actor’s character traits and attitudes affected by applying gene technology
(associated with virtue ethics).
The ethical literature on gene technology often conceives the discussion as a
disagreement between two moral concerns: consequentialist and deontological
concerns (e.g., Runtenberg 1997; Reiss and Straughan 2002). However, our study
shows that virtue concerns were also present in the debate, especially since 2001.
This might reflect the growing interest in virtue concerns in environmental ethics in
general (cf. Deane-Drummond 2004; Sandler and Cafaro 2004; Sandler 2007).
Nevertheless, our results have to be taken with care: they might not be
representative for the entire academic debate on moral concerns about the release
of GM crops in agriculture as we deliberately selected certain types of journals.
Moral Concerns About the Use of GM Crops in the Academic Debate
Moral concerns addressing consequences invoked rarely the impact on individual
plants (but see Balzer et al. 2000). Holtug (2001) stated that in context of the ‘‘harm
principle,’’ which in his opinion has to be the moral basis for the regulation of GM
food, holistic entities such as biotic communities and plants as non-sentient entities
are often excluded as they cannot suffer. However, in recent years it is discussed
how to ascribe a morally relevant value to certain characteristics of plants in a
consequentialist sense. One example is the ‘‘value of flourishing’’13 by Kallhoff
(2002). This concept implies that it is in the ‘‘interest’’ of a plant to develop and
13 In German: ‘‘Wert des pflanzlichen Gedeihens.’’
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grow according to its species-specific characteristics, complete its life cycle and
flourish in a stress-free environment. In a similar way, Attfield (2003) ascribed an
intrinsic value to individual plants, including GM crops, as they can grow,
photosynthesize and respire, reproduce and self-repair.
The lack of articles dealing with the intrinsic value of individual organisms in a
consequentialist way might be due to our focus on plants. Plants have no interests as
they lack the ability to feel and express pain, which is crucial for sentientist
consequentialism to assign the intrinsic value to a biotic entity. Reiss and Straughan
(2002) pointed out that questions about the moral status of organisms are more
important in the debate on transgenic animals. Regarding transgenic plants, socio-
economic questions are said to be more prominent (cf. Reiss and Straughan 2002;
Gonzalez 2007). This was also reflected by our finding that articles referring to
general environmental consequences of GM crops often dealt with questions
concerning socio-economic aspects (e.g., Goga and Clementi 2002; Bruce 2002a;
Bruce 2003). Even articles in natural sciences journals (‘‘Science’’ and ‘‘Nature’’)
dealt with socio-economic concerns such as concerns about food security and living
conditions of farmers in developing countries (e.g., Serageldin 1999; Wambugu
1999).
General ecological concerns were often directed to risk assessment and risk
management. This can be explained by the controversial debate on the underlying
principles of risk assessment, following the adoption of the Cartagena Protocol in
2000 (cf. Nisbet and Huge 2007). Since then, the ethical implications of the
precautionary principle and of the concept of substantial equivalence14 were broadly
discussed (e.g., Pouteau 2000). This is also reflected in the increasing number of
articles addressing risk assessment (especially the precautionary principle) after the
turn of the century in our literature review (e.g., Mayer and Stirling 2002;
Skorupinski 2002; Myhr and Traavik 2003a; Myhr and Traavik 2003b). One
element of this discourse are concerns about (scientific) uncertainty that are
frequently addressed in the literature (e.g., Kasanmoentalib 1996; Carr and Levidow
2000; Myhr and Traavik 2002; Bo¨schen et al. 2006). Uncertainty is closely related
to questions about the acceptability of certain risks, the trade off between benefits
and harms, and scientific research or risk assessment as such. In this context,
questions arise with which scientists are unfamiliar, for example how to define
acceptable ecological risks, how to address different risk perceptions in a liberal
society (e.g., Jensen 2006), or how to deal with different approaches in risk
assessment in Europe and in the United States (e.g., Ramjoue´ 2007).
General ecological concern not only addressed risk assessment, but also the
future of agriculture and the possible contribution of gene technology to a
sustainable development. In articles discussing sustainable agriculture most often
the safety of GM crops, the value of naturalness (used especially in context of
organic farming), or socio-economic questions like the market concentration in
global seed industry are addressed. However, the contribution of gene technology to
a sustainable agriculture is a controversially discussed concern in the literature, i.e.,
14 Sustainable equivalence is a concept that states that GM food should be considered the same as
conventional food if it shows the same characteristics and composition as the conventional food.
Ethical Discourse on the Use of Genetically Modified Crops 283
123
whether gene technology is a sustainable approach or not. This controversy might
be based on different understandings and definitions of sustainable agriculture. This
is especially true if only organic farming is considered as a sustainable form of
agriculture (cf. Verhoog 1997).
Moral concerns addressing the act, in particular those about naturalness, were
common in the reviewed literature. Using naturalness in a normative sense either for
or against gene technology is seen as a ‘‘naturalistic fallacy’’ (for instance, criticized
by Comstock 1989 and Myskja 2006). A naturalistic fallacy is committed whenever
a statement or argument attempts to prove that something is in a certain way natural
and therefore ought to be that way. It has also been criticized that concerns about
naturalness are quite meaningless, as there are many different meanings and types of
naturalness (Cooley and Goreham 2004; Siipi 2008).
Concerns about the value of biotic entities were less prominent in the reviewed
literature than concerns about the value of naturalness. Most often, an intrinsic value
was assigned to holistic biotic entities such as species, ecosystems or the biotic
community, whereas only few articles assigned an intrinsic value to individual
plants. Even among environmental ethicists no consensus exists whether an intrinsic
value can be assigned to individual plants (e.g., Melin 2004).
Moral concerns addressing the actor were linked in several articles to moral
concerns addressing the act (pointing to deontological ethics) (e.g., Katz 1993;
Westra 1998; Kirkham 2006). For instance, notions such as ‘‘vexing nature’’ or
‘‘playing God,’’ which are used in context of act-orientated concerns, also have
virtue-based implications invoking questions about the purpose of technology and
the place of humanity within the natural environment (Kirkham 2006). Among
actor-based concerns, virtues that are related to the handling of risks were
important. Most often, the virtues of trustworthiness (of science as well as of politics
and the market) and responsibility were mentioned. These virtues imply that actors
are concerned about their actions and act in ways that promote or maintain
environmental goods or values. When focusing on risks and benefits, i.e., on the
outcome of gene technology, virtues like responsibility can be linked to concerns
about consequences.
In the last decade, virtues such as humility, wisdom, care, justice, and
appreciation have received increasing attention in environmental ethics. These
virtues, which we grouped under the header of ‘‘virtues related to the application of
GM crops,’’ are justified by the worth of living organisms and humans’ relationship
with nature (cf. Sandler 2007). Because living organisms are valuable, humans have
to behave prudently and respectfully towards them. Seen in this way, virtues related
to the application of GM crops deal with the respect for living organisms and can
overlap with act-orientated concerns. For example, the virtue of humility and the
closely related virtue of caution can be linked to the concept of ecological integrity
(Westra 1998). Moreover, virtues related to the application of GM crops can be
linked to concerns addressing consequences. For instance, the precautionary
principle with its aim to minimize ecological risks is based on consequentialist
concerns. However, precaution is also related to attitudes of an actor, especially to
the virtues of wisdom and care (cf. Deane-Drummond 2002; Mayer and Stirling
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2002). To have such a virtue-based interpretation of the precautionary principle in
mind is helpful to avoid misunderstandings in the public debate.
Virtue concerns can be linked to other type of moral concerns, i.e., concerns
addressing the act and concerns addressing consequences. Moral concerns
addressing the actor can thus help to overcome the often presupposed dichotomy
of consequentialist and deontological concerns in the debate on the use GM crops.
Pluralistic forms of virtue ethics theories exist that integrate non-virtue-based
reasons that play a role in deontology or consequentialism (Crisp 2003). For
instance, it was stated by Hursthouse (2003) that virtue ethics appears to stand
‘‘shoulder to shoulder’’ with deontology. With the focus on the individual person’s
character traits, virtue ethics add a new viewpoint to the overall ethical debate, as
the actor is not the prime focus in consequentialism or deontology.
In the reviewed literature, environmental concerns were closely linked to socio-
economic concerns in several articles, for example, to questions about ecological
and social justice or to the trustworthiness of science, politics, and the market (e.g.,
Wambugu 1999; Scott 2000; Scott 2003; Goga and Clementi 2002; Bruce 2002a;
Bruce 2003). This shows that the debate about the ecological and environmental
ethical aspects of GM crops is also a debate about the role of science, the role of
politics and the market, and the role of laypersons in public as consumers. It is
therefore doubtful whether the environmental debate on GM crops can be held
separately from the debate on socio-economic aspects or whether they are mutually
dependent.
Comparison of the Academic and Laypersons’ Debate on the Use of GM Crops
Moral concerns of laypersons play an important role in the public debate on GM
crops. Although moral concerns and arguments similar to those expressed by
academics are put forward by laypersons in the public debate, laypersons’ concerns
do not only reflect scientific arguments associated with gene technology (cf.
Harlander 1991), but also more fundamental personal beliefs (Hoban et al. 1992).
Moreover, the risk perception between laypersons and scientific experts (in the field
of biological sciences) differs in certain points: experts significantly and system-
atically perceive biotechnology as less risky than laypersons do (Savadori et al.
2004; Sjo¨berg 2008) and consider its applications in food production as more useful
(Savadori et al. 2004). However, despite these dissimilarities moral concerns
addressing consequences are prominent in the public debate on GM crops or GM
food, too (e.g., Frewer et al. 1997a; Saba et al. 1998; Gaskell 2000; Gaskell et al.
2000; Magnusson and Koivisto Hursti 2002; Amin et al. 2007; Chen and Li 2007;
Henson et al. 2008).
Moral concerns addressing the act are often invoked in the moral reasoning of
laypersons (Hansen et al. 2003; Frewer et al. 2004; Siegrist 2008; Tanner et al.
2008). This is especially true for concerns about naturalness: about 65% of the
participants in the 2002 Eurobarometer survey agreed that GM food threatens the
natural order of things (Peters and Sawicka 2007). Concerns about the loss of
naturalness have been recognized as important constituents of unease among the
public (e.g., Reif and Melich 1996; Frewer et al. 1997b; Melich 2000). Naturalness
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concerns are often addressed by the public to express a desire for a world untouched
by humans (Du¨rnberger 2008). However, laypersons are less concerned about the
infringement of the intrinsic value in modifying plants than in the modification of
animals (cf. Frewer et al. 1997a; Kinsey and Senauer 1997; Ganiere et al. 2006). In
the academic debate, the moral status of plants appears to be less important.
In contrast to concerns addressing consequences or the act itself, moral concerns
addressing the actor were rarely found in recent studies on the laypersons’
perception of gene technology. However, several surveys have shown that
trustworthiness is crucial for laypersons (Brown and Ping 2003; Frewer 2003;
Gaskell et al. 2003; Hansen et al. 2003; Frewer et al. 2004; Savadori et al. 2004;
Chen and Li 2007; Siegrist 2008). Therefore, virtues essential for handling risks are
important for initiating and establishing a dialogue between academic experts and
laypersons.
Similar to academic experts, laypersons base their moral reasoning about GM
crops on concerns about perceived risks, unnaturalness, and personal ethical beliefs.
However, conflicts within the public about GM crops are not likely to be solved by
more knowledge about potential ecological risks. These conflicts are deeply rooted
in personal ideas about life and nature, i.e., deontological and virtue concerns,
which are important for the moral reasoning of laypersons, as recent psychological
research showed (Tanner et al. 2008). Social and psychological scientists could help
to identify factors that motivate and lead people to certain attitudes towards gene
technology. Knowing the motivations of others makes it easier to take their position
seriously, accepting that they do not act in bad faith but simply against a different
normative backdrop. In this regard, ethicists are important for the dialogue between
academic experts and laypersons in the public: they can discuss how moral concerns
are used by laypersons and how a sound and well-grounded moral reasoning has to
be established. Moreover, natural scientists can contribute to the debate with their
expertise on ecological concerns. Knowledge of risks and benefits is fundamental
for moral reasoning, especially for consequentialist ethics.
Conclusions
The literature review showed that there is no single dichotomy between moral
concerns addressing consequences and the act, i.e., consequentialist and deonto-
logical concerns. Moral concerns addressing the actor, i.e., virtue concerns, were
also present and linked with the other two concerns (cf. Crisp 2003; Hursthouse
2003). Environmental virtue ethics with its focus on the individual actor could help
to bridge the split between deontological and consequentialist concerns. Psycho-
logical research on act choices (Tanner et al. 2008) indicates that deontological and
consequentialist concerns are not mutually exclusive in the reasoning of laypersons:
different types of moral concerns are often intertwined in laypersons’ decision-
making on act choices.
The perception of gene technology by academic experts, especially by natural
scientists, differs from that of laypersons. The moral reasoning of academic experts
is well-founded on ecological concerns; their arguments are carefully considered
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and critically discussed. However, among laypersons, ecological concerns are more
often associated with personal lifestyles and individual preferences (Korthals 2001;
Meijboom et al. 2003). Ethics as the discipline that analyzes and justifies moral
reasoning could help to take into account moral concerns of the general public in the
debate on the use of GM crops by establishing an ‘‘empirically informed ethics’’ (cf.
Musschenga 2005). Empirically informed ethics combines doing empirical research
with philosophical analysis and reflection (Musschenga 2005). It could improve the
context sensitivity in the debate on GM crops, for example, by addressing the
personal lifestyles of laypersons. As consumers, laypersons are not only concerned
with risk and safety of GM crops, but also follow personal preferences in their
decisions (Korthals 2001). Ethicists could bridge the gap between the moral
perception of (natural) scientists and laypersons with the help of an empirically
informed ethics.
In moral philosophy, models are used that help to structure and analyze a moral
debate. Moreover, practical tools for decision-making processes that integrate
different moral concerns are provided. Such models and tools were developed, for
instance, by Fraser (2001), Busch et al. (2002), Forsberg (2007) and Mepham
(2008). The aim of such tools is to support a systematic public deliberation about the
ethical aspects of agricultural biotechnologies (Beekman and Brom 2007).
However, they rarely include virtue concerns and, if so, only address the virtue
of justice. The present results exemplify the relevance of different virtues in the
ecological discourse on the release of GM crops that should be integrated in the
respective models and tools. They can help to overcome the focus in the debate on
deontology and consequentialism. An example of how to integrate virtue concerns is
the tool for ethical decision-making by Bleisch and Huppenbauer (2011).
Our study is the first to provide a comprehensive overview of the moral reasoning
expressed in academic publications on the use of GM crops. It shows which types of
moral concerns are expressed in the debate, how they are mutually linked, and could
thus contribute to a better understanding of the academic debate on the release of
GM crops. It would be helpful to investigate the public debate in the same way. To
know the various types of moral concerns and their different usage in the academic
as well as in the public debate would be a crucial starting point to develop a fruitful
dialogue between sciences and the general public.
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